ABSTRACT Mobile devices have become the major platforms of the Internet of Things applications for industrial enterprises. The ever-increasing number of Android Phone users has raised great concerns regarding the privacy issues related to the use of Android Apps. Freely downloadable apps requesting a large number of permissions have resulted in severe privacy concerns. While granting the permissions, users usually do not read their details or are unable to judge an app based on the permissions requested. In this paper, we address the privacy issues by categorizing app permissions into privacy invasive and generic permissions and validating the classification using the Naïve Bayes classifier.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging paradigm of Internet of Things (IoT) facilitates the exchange of data and information among connected devices and systems. As an ongoing trend, mobile devices have become the major platforms of IoT applications for industrial enterprises [1] . The dynamic nature of IoT applications demands reliable and consistent services. For instance, the Open Services Gate Initiative (OSGi) platform based on a dynamic Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) can enable and deploy smart services such as mobile apps in industrial contexts [2] . With the emergence of a connected world, mobile phones are playing a major role in facilitating the applications for various settings of industrial IoT. As the mobile phones in the modern world are enabled with sensors, it is now possible for a common user to easily capture and share all kinds of information.
Android apps have become increasingly popular among all the mobile platforms. In the first quarter of 2017, the market share of Android-based phones was 85%, whereas iOS phones captured 14.7% of the market, Windows Phones owe 0.1% of the market and 0.1% by all other platforms [3] . The popularity of Android phones is due to a huge gamut of apps available on Google Playstore. While some of the apps are freely downloadable, others are paid. While installing the apps, users are supposed to grant a huge list of permissions, out of which many permissions are not required and are 'dangerous'. Usually, users do not read the entire permission set requested before installing the app. The GP-PP (Generic Permissions-Privacy invasive permissions) model is useful to classify the permissions into Generic and Privacy invasive permissions [4] . The model proposes a simplistic way for users to decide which apps are dangerous to install. Based on the permission set that a particular app requests, the GP-PP model classifies an app as privacy invasive if majority of the permissions requested are privacy invasive. So, users can decide which set of permissions can be harmful. Therefore, by looking at the set of permissions requested, a user can determine whether an app is privacy invasive or not. In other words, a user can determine whether it is safe to install the said app or not.
Although the proposed GP-PP model seems valuable, its efficacy has not been fully assessed. To address this gap, we test the effectiveness of the GP-PP model using Naïve Bayes Classifier in this paper. In particular, we validate the GP-PP model in order to verify whether the model classifies an app on the basis of permission sets that the app requests. Our study confirms that greater the number of Privacyinvasive permissions that an app requests, more dangerous it is to install the app. In summary, the major contribution of the paper is the validation of the proposed GP-PP model using Naïve Bayes Classifier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the prior literature. Preliminaries including the GP-PP model are given in Section 3. Section 4 highlights the experiments and results, which are further discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the entire paper.
II. RALETED WORKS
Due to the increasingly use of smart-phones with Android being the major operating system, several researchers are working on the security issues in Android-based phones. At the same time privacy leaks have been a major issue in Android phones. Several researchers have conducted research on the privacy issues in Android apps [5] - [11] .
Researchers have conducted semi-structured interviews to check whether the users read and understood the permissions requested or not [5] . The findings indicate that the users read the permission screens but do not usually understand the implications of agreeing to such a permission request. As per the research, android users are not prepared to make such decisions while installing the apps. Sarma et al. [6] propose risk signals indicating that an app is risky. They conclude that a malicious app requests more permissions than a general app. Thus, the importance of permission requests in deciding whether an app is dangerous or not cannot be ignored. A study of user content permissions on Facebook apps, Chrome apps and Android apps has been conducted by Chia et al. [9] , concluding that popular applications request more permissions than an average app.
Lin et al. [11] suggest a model of 'privacy as expectations'. They use crowdsourcing to capture users' expectations and devise a privacy summary interface in which they have highlighted the areas where mobile apps do not fulfill users' expectations.
Several researchers have also proposed some solutions to the privacy issues of android apps. For instance, Mann and Starostin [12] propose a framework that can generate the privacy policy. They perform static information flow analysis to the Andoid Apps' Dalvik bytecode which is available for analysis on the phone. The researchers also test the framework on self-developed android apps and develop a privacy policy which defines the signatures for the APIs and the application. These signatures decide which method parameters, return values and fields can contain private information. All the methods in the app are supposed to follow these signatures. They identify the following as Private information sources: Location data, Unique Identifiers such as International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), Call State, Authentication Data, Contact and calendar data. Enck et al. [13] suggest TaintDroid that tracks the flow of sensitive information through third party applications. The system automatically labels private and sensitive information and monitors this tainted data when it leaves the system. Liu et al. [14] conduct a study of privacy preferences of the users. They also analyze the feasibility of LBE privacy guard, a privacy and security app that allows users to grant specific permissions. Lin et al. [11] develop a model with 'Privacy as expectations' by using crowd-sourcing to capture users' expectations. The experiments conducted in the research indicate that properly informing the user of the purpose of access requested can ease the privacy concerns of the users. Considering users' intension of the transmission of sensitive data as an indicator of possible privacy leakage, Yang et al. [15] establish a framework to determine if data transmissions are user intended or not. Zhou et al. [16] demonstrate a method to systematically detect malicious Andriod apps based on some of their common behaviors. Analyzing the role of permissions and privacy in app-selection decisions, Kelley et al. [17] find that providing privacy information explicitly to users can help them make wise decisions to choose apps requesting fewer numbers of permissions. Mann and Starostin [12] identify potential privacy leaks of Android apps based on the analysis of static information flow. Exploring the privacy implications of ads in Android applications, Stevens et al. [18] compare and contrast the commonalities and disparities between inbrowser ads and in-app ads and then investigate their effects on user privacy concerns. Arzt et al. [19] present two static taint analysis tools, FlowDroid and DroidBench, to detect potential data leaks of Android apps. Rosen et al. [20] demonstrate an effective approach of creating a knowledge base and using it to help users make decision about the apps they want to install. Zhang et al. [21] suggest remote SMS based privacy information protection by using SMS as remote control of mobile phones. A lightweight security certification named Kirin has been proposed by Enck et al. [25] . The researchers propose security rules on the basis of which malware can be checked while installing apps.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous research has provided a simplified model which a lay man can adopt to detect and address the privacy issues. The systems suggested by the researchers need high level of expertise to monitor the privacy breaches. Thus, we develop a relatively simple model through which the user can easily detect which apps are dangerous and which ones are safe. The advantages of the GP-PP model allow its easy implementation so that even a naïve user can use this model to detect privacy invasiveness of android apps. Following upon the proposal of the GP-PP model [1] , we attempt to validate the GP-PP model which the users can use to detect which apps are dangerous to install.
III. ANALYZING ANDROID APP PRIVACY A. GP-PP (GENERIC PERMISSIONS-PRIVACY INVASIVE PERMISSIONS) MODEL
In [1] , we proposed the GP-PP model to test the privacy invasiveness of the android apps. While installing an app, users usually do not read the permissions requested by the app and accept it inadvertently. In this paper, we presented a Generic Permission -Privacy invasive permission model in which the Android app permissions are classified into two categories. We classify apps on the basis of set of permissions that the apps request into Generic Permissions (GP) and Privacy invasive Permissions (PP). Generic permissions include permissions which are more Generic in nature like Audio settings, Sync settings, wallpaper, alarm, status bar, storage, development tools, write user dictionary etc. Other set of permissions that have been described in the paper are privacy invasive permissions that affect the privacy of users. These include permissions like Your accounts, Your messages, Your personal information, Reading interaction info, Camera, Phone calls, Bluetooth, and Your location. We conduct our study based on 1021 free apps available on Google Playstore. The most popular apps in the categories listed on Google Playstore have been downloaded for the study. For instance, the top apps under the category 'Games' on Playstore have been installed on our Smart phone for the study. Similarly, other category apps on Playstore have been used to validate the proposed model.
In this paper, we indicate that by simply calculating the percentage of generic and privacy invasive permissions of an app, users can determine if the app can be safely downloaded. Figure 1 presents the classification of the permission set through GP-PP model. 
B. VALIDATION OF THE GP-PP MODEL
Several researchers have used Machine Learning techniques for malware detection in Android apps. An example of such malware detection approaches using Bayesian Classification has been given in [22] . An analysis of Bayesian Classification approached for detection of Android malware has been given in [23] . We have validated the GP-PP model using Naïve Bayes classifier [24] . Naïve Bayes is used in this research because it is easy to build even for large data sets and it is relatively fast as compared to other classification algorithms.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section describes the validation of the GP-PP model using Naïve Bayes classifier. Naïve Bayes uses the following equation to compute the Posterior probability of the class.
P(c|x) = P(x|c)P(c) P(x) P(c|x)
= P(x 1 |c) × P(x 2 |c) × · · · × P(x n |c) × P(c)(1)
Where
• P(c|x) is the posterior probability of class (c, target) given predictor (x, attributes).
• P(c) is the prior probability of class.
• P(x i |c) is the likelihood which is the probability of predictor given class.
• P(x) is the prior probability of predictor. The same training dataset was obtained and used as that in the original research of the GP-PP model [1] . The model was tested on 1021 freely downloadable apps from Google PlayStore. In order to check the validity of the model, we develop the Likelihood Table of There are two classes into which the permission set is classified: whether the permission is Privacy Invasive (Yes) or not (No). In order to check whether the results are correct or not, we calculate the Posterior probability of the two classes, given the Permission set. Following equations indicate the Posterior Probability of Class Yes and No for the VOLUME 6, 2018 permission 'Your app info'.
P(No|Your app info) = P(Your app info|No)P(No) P(Your app info) = 0.617284 P(Yes|Your app info) = P(Your app info|Yes)P(Yes) P(Your app info)
The equations indicate that permission 'Your app info' is not privacy invasive as the Posterior probability for Class No is 0.617284. Similarly, we calculate the Posterior Probability of other Permissions for both the classes Yes and No. The results for the permission 'Your Personal info' are shown in Equation (3).
P(Yes|Your personal info) = P(Your personal info|Yes)P(Yes) P(Your personal info)
The results indicate that most of the apps that request this kind of permission are Privacy invasive. Equation (4) indicates that the Posterior probability for the class Yes when the requested permission is access to the Camera is 0.79 whereas for the class No it is 0.26 indicating that most of the apps that request access to the Camera are Privacy invasive.
The Posterior Probabilities for Class Yes and No for the permission that requests access to Bluetooth are demonstrated in Equation (5) . Majority of the apps that request access to this permission are Privacy invasive.
P(Yes|Bluetooth) = P(Bluetooth|Yes)P(Yes) P(Bluetooth)
The Posterior probability for Class Yes and No for the permission 'System Tools' are 0.3367003 and 0.6734007 respectively as indicated in Equation (6) . The results imply that most of the apps that request access to this permission are not privacy invasive.
P(Yes|System tools) = P(System tools|Yes)P(Yes) P(System tools) = 0.3367003 P(No|System tools) = P(System tools|No)P(No) P(System tools)
Similarly, the results for Development Tools permission are given in Equation (7).
P(Yes|System tools) = P(System tools|Yes)P(Yes) P(System tools)
The Posterior Probability for Class Yes for the permissions 'Microphone' and 'Your messages' indicates that most of the apps that request access to the Microphone and messages of the Smartphone are dangerous.
Similarly, apps that request access to your location might be dangerous as indicated by Equation (9) .
P(Yes|Your location) = P(Your location|Yes)P(Yes) P(Your location)
Another set of permissions that fall under the Privacy invasive category are Reading interaction info and Reading Internet history whose Posterior Probability is given in Equation (10) and (11) respectively.
P(Yes|Reading interaction info) =

P(Reading interaction info|Yes)P(Yes)
P(Reading interaction info) = 0.999974 (10)
P(Yes|Read Internet history)
=
P(Read Internet history|Yes)P(Yes) P(Read Internet history)
Thus, the Posterior Probability of the classes Yes and No validates the GP-PP Model.
V. DISCUSSIONS
The results of the Naive Bayes Classifier applied to our model are tabulated in Table 2 .
The results indicate that the probability that an app is privacy invasive is almost 1 when the app requests the permissions like 'Your personal info', 'Microphone', 'Your messages', and 'Reading interaction info'. Therefore, it is almost certain that an app which requests these kinds of permissions is privacy invasive. The user must properly read the details of the permissions before installing such kinds of apps. Similarly, out of 10 apps that request permissions such as 'Camera', 'Your location', at least 7 apps are privacy invasive. Out of 10 apps that request permissions like 'Bluetooth' and 'Development Tools', 6 are privacy invasive.
The permissions that are generic, as validated by the model are 'Your application info' and 'System Tools' as the probability of the app being privacy invasive is pretty low when it requests such permissions, i.e., 0.4 and 0.3 respectively.
The permission that indicates that there may be 50-50 chances that an app is privacy invasive includes permissions such as 'Storage' and 'Your Phone Calls'. For such apps, users can have a look at the permission set that an app requests; depending upon whether there are more number of privacy invasive permissions or more of generic permissions, they can decide whether to install the app or not.
The proposed model is simple and easy to understand and can be even used by a lay man to check the android app before installing it. However, the model still bears the limitation of not being able to detect the possible privacy invasiveness of the app in complex situations. For instance, since many apps request more permissions than they actually require, the judgment of the privacy invasiveness of the app on the basis of the GP-PP model can result into not so invasive apps being judged as privacy invasive. Therefore, future research may need to test the accuracy of the proposed mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mobile devices have become the major platforms of IoT applications for industrial enterprises. The everincreasing number of Android Phone users has created great interests regarding the privacy issues of Android Apps. Users typically do not either read the permissions that an app requests or are unable to judge the app on the basis of permissions requested. In this research we address the privacy issues by categorizing the app permissions into Privacy invasive and Generic permissions and validating the classification using Naïve Bayes Classifier.
Our results indicate that as per the classification done by the GP-PP model and validated through the Naïve Bayes Classifier, users can decide upon which apps are safe to install and which apps are not depending on the permission set that the app is requesting. The permissions that fall into Privacy Invasive Class are Your personal information, Camera, Microphone, Reading interaction info, Bluetooth and Your location. Permissions that are not privacy invasive include Write user dictionary, Status Bar, Alarm, Wallpaper etc. As a thumb of rule, users should try to gain an insight before installing an app that requests more number of Privacy invasive permissions. When the number of Privacy invasive permissions an app requests increases, it is more likely that the app is dangerous to install. In addition, when the value of Posterior probability is higher, the permission requested is typically more dangerous. Thus, a user can determine (1) amongst the set of permissions requested, how many permissions are privacy invasive; and (2) the extent to which the permission requested is harmful with the posterior probability. Using the above two criteria, even a non-professional user can decide upon which set of permissions should be installed and which set should not be installed. 
